SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

被引：211

作者：

FUDENBERG, D ^{[1
]}

TIROLE, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] ECOLE NATL PONTS & CHAUSEES,CERAS,PARIS,FRANCE

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2297414

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：221 / 247

页数：27

共 24 条

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[5] CRAWFORD V, 1981, ECONOMETRICA, V50, P607
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FARBER, HS
KATZ, HC
[J]. INDUSTRIAL & LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW, 1979, 33 (01): : 55 - 63
[7] RESOURCE-ALLOCATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
HARRIS, M
TOWNSEND, RM
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (01) : 33 - 64
[8] GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PLAYED BY BAYESIAN PLAYERS .2. BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM POINTS
HARSANYI, JC
[J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1968, 14 (05) : 320 - 334
[9] Harsanyi J., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]
[10] Harsanyi J. C., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]