MONOTONIC SOLUTIONS TO GENERAL COOPERATIVE GAMES

[1] AUMANN RJ, UNPUB ECONOMETRICA

[2] EQUITY, ARROWS CONDITIONS, AND RAWLS DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1976, 44 (04) : 793 - 804

[3] Harsanyi J. C., 1959, CONTRIBUTIONS THEORY, VIV, P325, DOI 10.1515/9781400882168-019

[4] A SIMPLIFIED BARGAINING MODEL FOR THE NORMAL-PERSON COOPERATIVE GAME [J]. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1963, 4 (02) : 194 - 220

[5] CARDINAL WELFARE, INDIVIDUALISTIC ETHICS, AND INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF UTILITY [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1955, 63 (04) : 309 - 321

[6] HART S, 1983, 573 NW U CTR MATH ST

[7] PROPORTIONAL SOLUTIONS TO BARGAINING SITUATIONS - INTERPERSONAL UTILITY COMPARISONS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1977, 45 (07) : 1623 - 1630

[8] OTHER SOLUTIONS TO NASHS BARGAINING PROBLEM [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1975, 43 (03) : 513 - 518

[9] KALAI E, UNPUB SOCIAL GOALS S

[10] KALAI E, 1984, 602 NW U CTR MATH ST

[1] AUMANN RJ, UNPUB ECONOMETRICA

[2] EQUITY, ARROWS CONDITIONS, AND RAWLS DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1976, 44 (04) : 793 - 804

[3] Harsanyi J. C., 1959, CONTRIBUTIONS THEORY, VIV, P325, DOI 10.1515/9781400882168-019

[4] A SIMPLIFIED BARGAINING MODEL FOR THE NORMAL-PERSON COOPERATIVE GAME [J]. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1963, 4 (02) : 194 - 220

[5] CARDINAL WELFARE, INDIVIDUALISTIC ETHICS, AND INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF UTILITY [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1955, 63 (04) : 309 - 321

[6] HART S, 1983, 573 NW U CTR MATH ST

[7] PROPORTIONAL SOLUTIONS TO BARGAINING SITUATIONS - INTERPERSONAL UTILITY COMPARISONS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1977, 45 (07) : 1623 - 1630

[8] OTHER SOLUTIONS TO NASHS BARGAINING PROBLEM [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1975, 43 (03) : 513 - 518

[9] KALAI E, UNPUB SOCIAL GOALS S

[10] KALAI E, 1984, 602 NW U CTR MATH ST