BARTER AND MONETARY EXCHANGE UNDER PRIVATE INFORMATION

被引：7

作者：

WILLIAMSON, S

WRIGHT, R

机构：

[1] UNIV PENN,DEPT ECON,PHILADELPHIA,PA 19104

[2] FED RESERVE BANK MINNEAPOLIS,250 MARQUETTE AVE,MINNEAPOLIS,MN 55480

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1994年 / 84卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We develop a model of production and exchange with uncertainty concerning the quality of commodities and study the role of fiat money in ameliorating frictions caused by private information. The model is specified so that, without private information, only high-quality commodities are produced, and there is no welfare gain from using money. With private information, there can be equilibria (and sometimes multiple equilibria) where low-quality commodities are produced, and money can increase welfare. Money works by promoting useful production and exchange. In efficient monetary equilibria, agents adopt strategies that increase the probability of acquiring high-quality output.

引用

页码：104 / 123

页数：20

共 32 条

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