ENVIRONMENTAL-POLICY, PUBLIC-FINANCE AND THE LABOR-MARKET IN A 2ND-BEST WORLD

被引:144
作者
BOVENBERG, AL
VANDERPLOEG, F
机构
[1] UNIV AMSTERDAM,FEE,ROETERSSTR 11,1018 WB AMSTERDAM,NETHERLANDS
[2] TILBURG UNIV,CTR ECON RES,5000 LE TILBURG,NETHERLANDS
[3] ERASMUS UNIV ROTTERDAM,OCFEB,3000 DR ROTTERDAM,NETHERLANDS
关键词
ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES; CLEAN AND DIRTY GOODS; DIRT TAX; LABOR TAX; EXCESS BURDEN; PUBLIC GOODS; OPTIMAL TAXATION; DOUBLE DIVIDEND; 2ND BEST;
D O I
10.1016/0047-2727(93)01398-T
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Environmental and tax policies and the optimal provision of clean and dirty public goods are analysed within the context of a second-best framework of optimal taxation. Households consume both clean and dirty commodities. Degradation of the natural environment occurs due to the consumption of dirty private and public goods, but can be offset when the government engages in abatement activities. Increased environmental concern implies a higher dirt tax, a lower tax on labour, less employment, more public abatement, and a cleaner environment. If the elasticity of substitution between private consumption commodities and leisure is large and that between clean and dirty goods is small, public consumption may expand while private consumption contracts. Otherwise, public consumption falls.
引用
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页码:349 / 390
页数:42
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