INCENTIVES AND THE EXISTENCE OF PARETO-OPTIMAL REVELATION MECHANISMS

被引：22

作者：

DASPREMONT, C

CREMER, J

GERARDVARET, LA

机构：

[1] VIRGINIA POLYTECH INST & STATE UNIV,BLACKSBURG,VA 24061

[2] ECOLE HAUTES ETUD SCI SOCIALES,GREQE,MARSEILLE,FRANCE

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1990年 / 51卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(90)90017-E

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

From the characterization of strongly and Bayesian incentive compatible Paretooptimal mechanisms with transferable utilities, we derive the following results. If there are only two types per individual then a strongly incentive compatible Paretooptimal mechanism exists. If there are only two individuals (with more than three types) then there are sets of beliefs (open in the class of all beliefs) for which no Bayesian incentive compatible Pareto-optimal mechanism exists. If there are more than two individuals then the class of beliefs for which such mechanisms exist is open and dense in the class of all beliefs. © 1990.

引用

页码：233 / 254

页数：22

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