NEPOTISM VS TIT-FOR-TAT, OR, WHY SHOULD YOU BE NICE TO YOUR ROTTEN BROTHER

被引:16
作者
WILSON, DS
DUGATKIN, LA
机构
[1] Department of Biological Sciences, State University of New York, Binghamton, 13902-6000, New York
关键词
NEPOTISM; TIT-FOR-TAT; GAME THEORY; KIN SELECTION;
D O I
10.1007/BF02214233
中图分类号
Q14 [生态学(生物生态学)];
学科分类号
071012 ; 0713 ;
摘要
It is well known that interactions among relatives facilitate the evolution of altruistic behaviours. Game theoretic models show, however, that guarded altruism (such as Tit-For-Tat) can evolve among non-relatives when individuals interact many times and 'cheating' behaviours can be punished. Strangely, no one has yet asked whether the guarded altruism that evolves among non-relatives might also evolve among close relatives, supplanting unconditional altriusm. We present a series of one-locus sexual haploid models in which Tit-For-Tat, unconditional altruists and selfish individuals interact in groups of full siblings. Tit-For-Tat frequently (but not always) replaced unguarded altruism, in which case the strategic 'rules' for interacting with kin vs non-kin are identical. Even when Tit-For-Tat is selected at a single locus, however, by withholding altruism for non-reciprocating relatives it may qualify as an 'outlaw' from the standpoint of modifier genes at other loci.
引用
收藏
页码:291 / 299
页数:9
相关论文
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