NEPOTISM VS TIT-FOR-TAT, OR, WHY SHOULD YOU BE NICE TO YOUR ROTTEN BROTHER

被引:16
作者
WILSON, DS
DUGATKIN, LA
机构
[1] Department of Biological Sciences, State University of New York, Binghamton, 13902-6000, New York
关键词
NEPOTISM; TIT-FOR-TAT; GAME THEORY; KIN SELECTION;
D O I
10.1007/BF02214233
中图分类号
Q14 [生态学(生物生态学)];
学科分类号
071012 ; 0713 ;
摘要
It is well known that interactions among relatives facilitate the evolution of altruistic behaviours. Game theoretic models show, however, that guarded altruism (such as Tit-For-Tat) can evolve among non-relatives when individuals interact many times and 'cheating' behaviours can be punished. Strangely, no one has yet asked whether the guarded altruism that evolves among non-relatives might also evolve among close relatives, supplanting unconditional altriusm. We present a series of one-locus sexual haploid models in which Tit-For-Tat, unconditional altruists and selfish individuals interact in groups of full siblings. Tit-For-Tat frequently (but not always) replaced unguarded altruism, in which case the strategic 'rules' for interacting with kin vs non-kin are identical. Even when Tit-For-Tat is selected at a single locus, however, by withholding altruism for non-reciprocating relatives it may qualify as an 'outlaw' from the standpoint of modifier genes at other loci.
引用
收藏
页码:291 / 299
页数:9
相关论文
共 35 条
[31]  
Trivers R., Social evolution, (1985)
[32]  
Wade M., Breden F., The evolution of cheating and selfish behavior, Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol., 7, pp. 167-72, (1980)
[33]  
Wasser S., Reciprocity and the trade-off between associate quality and relatedness, Amer. Natur., 119, pp. 720-31, (1982)
[34]  
Wilson D.S., Structured demes and the evolution of group-advantageous traits, The American Naturalist, 111, pp. 157-85, (1977)
[35]  
Wilson D.S., The natural selection of populations and communities, (1980)