AN N-PERSON PURE BARGAINING GAME

被引:51
作者
CHAE, S
YANG, JA
机构
[1] Department of Economics, Rice University, Houston
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jeth.1994.1005
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We propose an n-person pure bargaining game which generalizes Rubinstein's two-person bargaining game, and show that there exists a unique perfect equilibrium outcome. The solution approaches the n-person Nash solution, as defined by Chae [''The n-person Nash bargaining solution with time preference,'' Econ. Lett. 41 (1993), 21-24] in the time preference framework, as the time lapse between bargaining rounds goes to 0. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
引用
收藏
页码:86 / 102
页数:17
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