LEGISLATIVE COALITIONS AND ELECTORAL EQUILIBRIUM

[1] 2-PARTY COMPETITION WITH MANY CONSTITUENCIES [J]. MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 1984, 7 (02) : 177 - 198

[2] Axelrod R., 1970, CONFLICT INTEREST

[3] BERNHARDT D, 1984, UNPUB J PUBLIC EC

[4] A NEW APPROACH TO VOTER UNCERTAINTY IN THE DOWNSIAN SPATIAL MODEL [J]. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 1981, 25 (03) : 483 - 493

[5] ENELOW JM, 1982, AM POLIT SCI REV, V76, P493, DOI 10.2307/1963727

[6] Enelow JM., 1984, SPATIAL THEORY VOTIN

[7] AMBIGUITY IN SPATIAL MODELS OF POLICY FORMATION [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1980, 35 (04) : 385 - 402

[8] COMPETITIVE SOLUTION FOR N-PERSON GAMES WITHOUT TRANSFERABLE UTILITY, WITH AN APPLICATION TO COMMITTEE GAMES [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1978, 72 (02) : 599 - 615

[9] Riker William H., 1962, THEORY POLITICAL COA

[10] SCHOFIELD N, 1984, COALITIONS COLLECTIV

[1] 2-PARTY COMPETITION WITH MANY CONSTITUENCIES [J]. MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 1984, 7 (02) : 177 - 198

[2] Axelrod R., 1970, CONFLICT INTEREST

[3] BERNHARDT D, 1984, UNPUB J PUBLIC EC

[4] A NEW APPROACH TO VOTER UNCERTAINTY IN THE DOWNSIAN SPATIAL MODEL [J]. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 1981, 25 (03) : 483 - 493

[5] ENELOW JM, 1982, AM POLIT SCI REV, V76, P493, DOI 10.2307/1963727

[6] Enelow JM., 1984, SPATIAL THEORY VOTIN

[7] AMBIGUITY IN SPATIAL MODELS OF POLICY FORMATION [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1980, 35 (04) : 385 - 402

[8] COMPETITIVE SOLUTION FOR N-PERSON GAMES WITHOUT TRANSFERABLE UTILITY, WITH AN APPLICATION TO COMMITTEE GAMES [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1978, 72 (02) : 599 - 615

[9] Riker William H., 1962, THEORY POLITICAL COA

[10] SCHOFIELD N, 1984, COALITIONS COLLECTIV