MONITORING AND HIERARCHIES - THE MARGINAL VALUE OF INFORMATION IN A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL

被引：28

作者：

SINGH, N

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/261318

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：599 / 609

页数：11

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