REPUTATION AND HEGEMONIC STABILITY - A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS

被引:76
作者
ALT, JE
CALVERT, RL
HUMES, BD
机构
[1] UNIV ROCHESTER,POLIT SCI,ROCHESTER,NY 14627
[2] MICHIGAN STATE UNIV,POLIT SCI,E LANSING,MI 48824
关键词
D O I
10.2307/1957395
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:445 / 466
页数:22
相关论文
共 46 条
[1]  
AHRARI ME, 1986, OPEC FALLING GIANT
[2]  
[Anonymous], 1973, WORLD DEPRESSION 192
[3]  
[Anonymous], 1957, GAMES DECIS
[4]  
[Anonymous], 1985, WASHINGTON POST 0226
[5]  
Axelrod R., 1984, EVOLUTION COOPERATIO
[7]   THREAT POWER IN SEQUENTIAL GAMES [J].
BRAMS, SJ ;
HESSEL, MP .
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, 1984, 28 (01) :23-44
[8]   REPUTATION AND LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP [J].
CALVERT, RL .
PUBLIC CHOICE, 1987, 55 (1-2) :81-119
[9]   A PROBABILITY MODEL OF CREDIBILITY - ANALYZING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENCE SYSTEMS [J].
CIOFFIREVILLA, C .
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 1983, 27 (01) :73-108
[10]  
DeGroot, 1970, OPTIMAL STAT DECISIO, V82