REPUTATION AND HEGEMONIC STABILITY - A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS

被引:76
作者
ALT, JE
CALVERT, RL
HUMES, BD
机构
[1] UNIV ROCHESTER,POLIT SCI,ROCHESTER,NY 14627
[2] MICHIGAN STATE UNIV,POLIT SCI,E LANSING,MI 48824
关键词
D O I
10.2307/1957395
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:445 / 466
页数:22
相关论文
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