THE USE OF AN AGENT IN A SIGNALING MODEL

被引:13
作者
CAILLAUD, B
HERMALIN, B
机构
[1] UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720
[2] CERAS ENPC,PARIS,FRANCE
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jeth.1993.1036
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Finance and I.O. models, in which a firm’s manager signals information, typically ignore agency problems. How serious is this? We derive conditions under which models with agency problems yield qualitatively similar predictions to models without agency problems. These conditions, however, are generally much stronger than what the earlier literature assumes. We also show that the principal can do better by hiring an agent to signal for her than by signalling herself. It is even possible that the principal’s expected profit is increasing in the cost of agency! Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82, L22. © 1993 by Academic Press, Inc.
引用
收藏
页码:83 / 113
页数:31
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