STRATEGIC STABILITY AND UNIQUENESS IN SIGNALING GAMES

被引：169

作者：

CHO, IK ^{[1
]}

SOBEL, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF SAN DIEGO,DEPT ECON,LA JOLLA,CA 92093

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1990年 / 50卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(90)90009-9

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A class of signaling games is studied in which a unique Universally Divine equilibrium outcome exists. We identify a monotonicity property under which a variation of Universal Divinity is generically equivalent to strategic stability. Further assumptions guarantee the existence of a unique Universally Divine outcome. © 1990.

引用

页码：381 / 413

页数：33

共 23 条

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[4] BANKS JS, 1988, UNPUB PRICING REGULA
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CHO, IK
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[9] ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENTS
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KREPS, DM
LEVINE, DK
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1988, 44 (02) : 354 - 380
[10] PERFECT SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM
GROSSMAN, SJ
PERRY, M
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1986, 39 (01) : 97 - 119

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