INVESTMENT AND INSIDER TRADING

被引：33

作者：

BERNHARDT, D

HOLLIFIELD, B

HUGHSON, E

机构：

[1] UNIV BRITISH COLUMBIA,FAC COMMERCE & BUSINESS ADM,2053 MAIN MALL,VANCOUVER,BC V6T 1Z2,CANADA

[2] CALTECH,PASADENA,CA 91125

[3] QUEENS UNIV,KINGSTON,ON K7L 3N6,CANADA

来源：

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 1995年 / 8卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1093/rfs/8.2.501

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We study insider trading in a dynamic setting. Rational, but uninformed, traders choose between investment projects with different levels of insider trading. Insider trading distorts investment toward assets with less private information. However, when investment is sufficiently information elastic, insider trading can be welfare-enhancing because of more informative prices. When insiders repeatedly receive information, they trade to reveal it when investment is information elastic because good news increases investment and hence future insider profits. Thus, more information is revealed and uninformed agents are exploited less frequently by insiders. Both effects are Pareto-improving. Finally, we consider various insider-trading regulations.

引用

页码：501 / 543

页数：43

共 19 条

[1]

ADMATI AR, 1988, REV FINANC STUD, V1, P1

[2]

AUSUBEL LM, 1990, AM ECON REV, V80, P1022

[3]

BERNHARDT D, 1994, CANADIAN J EC

[4] INSIDERS, OUTSIDERS, AND INFORMATIONAL ADVANTAGES UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES-LAWS [J].