A THEORY OF PREDATION BASED ON AGENCY PROBLEMS IN FINANCIAL CONTRACTING

被引：163

作者：

BOLTON, P ^{[1
]}

SCHARFSTEIN, DS ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] MIT,ALFRED P SLOAN SCH MANAGEMENT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：93 / 106

页数：14

共 29 条

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[2]

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[3]

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[4]

Donaldson G., 1984, MANAGING CORPORATE W

[5]

FERSHTMAN C, 1987, AM ECON REV, V77, P927

[6]

FERSHTMAN C, 1987, STRATEGIC INCENTIVE

[7]

FLANNERY MJ, 1986, J FINANC, V41, P19

[8] A SIGNAL-JAMMING THEORY OF PREDATION [J].

FUDENBERG, D ;

TIROLE, J .

[9] INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE DEBT CONTRACTS - THE ONE-PERIOD PROBLEM [J].

GALE, D ;

HELLWIG, M .

[10]

Gertner Robert, 1988, RAND J ECON, V19, P173