FINANCIALLY CONSTRAINED ENTRY IN A GAME WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

被引：81

作者：

BENOIT, JP

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2555520

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：490 / 499

页数：10

共 8 条

[1] BENOIT JP, 1983, IMSSS405 STANF U TEC
[2] GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PLAYED BY BAYESIAN PLAYERS .2. BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM POINTS
HARSANYI, JC
[J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1968, 14 (05) : 320 - 334
[3] Harsanyi J., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]
[4] Harsanyi J. C., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]
[5] SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIA
KREPS, DM
WILSON, R
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (04) : 863 - 894
[6] REPUTATION AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION
KREPS, DM
WILSON, R
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 253 - 279
[7] PREDATION, REPUTATION, AND ENTRY DETERRENCE
MILGROM, P
ROBERTS, J
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 280 - 312
[8] Shubik M., 2013, MARKET STRUCTURE BEH