SYMMETRICAL BIDDING IN 2ND-PRICE, COMMON-VALUE AUCTIONS

[1] A CLASS OF DOMINANCE SOLVABLE COMMON-VALUE AUCTIONS [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1985, 52 (03) : 525 - 528

[2] LEVIN D, 1985, ASYMPTOTIC DOMINANCE

[3] MATTHEWS SA, 1977, INFORMATION ACQUISIT

[4] RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS, INFORMATION ACQUISITION, AND COMPETITIVE BIDDING [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (04) : 921 - 943

[5] CONVERGENCE THEOREM FOR COMPETITIVE BIDDING WITH DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1979, 47 (03) : 679 - 688

[6] DOMINANCE SOLVABLE VOTING SCHEMES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1979, 47 (06) : 1337 - 1351

[7] COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1961, 16 (01) : 8 - 37

[1] A CLASS OF DOMINANCE SOLVABLE COMMON-VALUE AUCTIONS [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1985, 52 (03) : 525 - 528

[2] LEVIN D, 1985, ASYMPTOTIC DOMINANCE

[3] MATTHEWS SA, 1977, INFORMATION ACQUISIT

[4] RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS, INFORMATION ACQUISITION, AND COMPETITIVE BIDDING [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (04) : 921 - 943

[5] CONVERGENCE THEOREM FOR COMPETITIVE BIDDING WITH DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1979, 47 (03) : 679 - 688

[6] DOMINANCE SOLVABLE VOTING SCHEMES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1979, 47 (06) : 1337 - 1351

[7] COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1961, 16 (01) : 8 - 37