A SURVEY OF AGENCY MODELS OF ORGANIZATIONS

[1] [Anonymous], 1953, ESSAYS POSITIVE EC

[2] Arrow K., 1971, ESSAYS THEORY RISK B

[3] Arrow K. J., 1984, 451 I MATH STUD SOC

[4] IMPLICIT CONTRACTS AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIA [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1975, 83 (06) : 1183 - 1202

[5] AZARIADIS C, 1983, Q J EC, V108, P1

[6] PRE-DECISION INFORMATION AND PARTICIPATIVE MANAGEMENT CONTROL-SYSTEMS [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 1983, 21 (02) : 371 - 395

[7] ECONOMICALLY OPTIMAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND CONTROL-SYSTEMS [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 1980, 18 : 184 - 220

[8] Baiman S., 1982, J ACCOUNTING LIT, V1, P154

[9] BANKER R, 1985, SENSITIVITY PRECISIO

[10] REGULATING A MONOPOLIST WITH UNKNOWN COSTS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (04) : 911 - 930

[1] [Anonymous], 1953, ESSAYS POSITIVE EC

[2] Arrow K., 1971, ESSAYS THEORY RISK B

[3] Arrow K. J., 1984, 451 I MATH STUD SOC

[4] IMPLICIT CONTRACTS AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIA [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1975, 83 (06) : 1183 - 1202

[5] AZARIADIS C, 1983, Q J EC, V108, P1

[6] PRE-DECISION INFORMATION AND PARTICIPATIVE MANAGEMENT CONTROL-SYSTEMS [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 1983, 21 (02) : 371 - 395

[7] ECONOMICALLY OPTIMAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND CONTROL-SYSTEMS [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 1980, 18 : 184 - 220

[8] Baiman S., 1982, J ACCOUNTING LIT, V1, P154

[9] BANKER R, 1985, SENSITIVITY PRECISIO

[10] REGULATING A MONOPOLIST WITH UNKNOWN COSTS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (04) : 911 - 930