A SURVEY OF AGENCY MODELS OF ORGANIZATIONS

[51] MECHANISM DESIGN BY AN INFORMED PRINCIPAL [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1983, 51 (06) : 1767 - 1797

[52] NALEBUFF BJ, 1983, AM ECON REV, V73, P278

[53] PRIZES AND INCENTIVES - TOWARDS A GENERAL-THEORY OF COMPENSATION AND COMPETITION [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 14 (01): : 21 - 43

[54] REPEATED INSURANCE CONTRACTS AND LEARNING [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1985, 16 (03) : 356 - 367

[55] MONITORING COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN A REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (05) : 1127 - 1148

[56] RADNER R, 1979, CAN BOUNDED RATIONAL

[57] RADNER R, 1981, OPTIMAL EQUILIBRIA C

[58] Robinson E. A., 1934, ECON J, V44, P240

[59] ROGERSON W, 1982, STRUCTURE WAGE CONTR

[60] THE 1ST ORDER APPROACH TO PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (06) : 1357 - 1367

[51] MECHANISM DESIGN BY AN INFORMED PRINCIPAL [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1983, 51 (06) : 1767 - 1797

[52] NALEBUFF BJ, 1983, AM ECON REV, V73, P278

[53] PRIZES AND INCENTIVES - TOWARDS A GENERAL-THEORY OF COMPENSATION AND COMPETITION [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 14 (01): : 21 - 43

[54] REPEATED INSURANCE CONTRACTS AND LEARNING [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1985, 16 (03) : 356 - 367

[55] MONITORING COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN A REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (05) : 1127 - 1148

[56] RADNER R, 1979, CAN BOUNDED RATIONAL

[57] RADNER R, 1981, OPTIMAL EQUILIBRIA C

[58] Robinson E. A., 1934, ECON J, V44, P240

[59] ROGERSON W, 1982, STRUCTURE WAGE CONTR

[60] THE 1ST ORDER APPROACH TO PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (06) : 1357 - 1367