Under-diversification and retention commitments in IPOs

被引:36
作者
Courteau, L
机构
[1] University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2331274
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study is an extension of Leland and Pyle's (1977) signaling model. It introduces, in addition to the retained ownership, the length of the holding period to which the owner commits in the prospectus as a signal of firm value. The length of the holding period is found to be a signaling mechanism that complements ownership retention, Depending on the information structure of the firm, the entrepreneur may prefer to commit to a holding period longer than the minimum required by securities regulations.
引用
收藏
页码:487 / 517
页数:31
相关论文
共 15 条
[1]   SIGNALING BY UNDERPRICING IN THE IPO MARKET [J].
ALLEN, F ;
FAULHABER, GR .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1989, 23 (02) :303-323
[2]   EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN SIGNALING GAMES [J].
BANKS, JS ;
SOBEL, J .
ECONOMETRICA, 1987, 55 (03) :647-661
[3]   EQUIVALENT COMPARISONS OF EXPERIMENTS [J].
BLACKWELL, D .
ANNALS OF MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS, 1953, 24 (02) :265-272
[4]   SIGNALING GAMES AND STABLE EQUILIBRIA [J].
CHO, IK ;
KREPS, DM .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1987, 102 (02) :179-221
[5]  
COURTEAU L, 1992, THESIS U BRIT COLUMB
[6]   THE ROLE OF AUDITS AND AUDIT QUALITY IN VALUING NEW ISSUES [J].
DATAR, SM ;
FELTHAM, GA ;
HUGHES, JS .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 1991, 14 (01) :3-49
[7]   EMPIRICAL-ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF AUDITOR QUALITY ON THE VALUATION OF NEW ISSUES [J].
FELTHAM, GA ;
HUGHES, JS ;
SIMUNIC, DA .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 1991, 14 (04) :375-399
[8]   THE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS [J].
GALE, I ;
STIGLITZ, JE .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1989, 44 (02) :469-477
[9]   SIGNALING AND THE PRICING OF NEW ISSUES [J].
GRINBLATT, M ;
HWANG, CY .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1989, 44 (02) :393-420
[10]   SIGNALING BY DIRECT DISCLOSURE UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION [J].
HUGHES, PJ .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 1986, 8 (02) :119-142