INCENTIVES, PAY, AND PERFORMANCE - A STUDY OF AUSTRALIAN EMPLOYEES

被引:20
作者
DRAGO, R
机构
[1] University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, PO Box 413
基金
澳大利亚研究理事会;
关键词
D O I
10.1080/00036849100000194
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The paper analyses the determinants of self-reported work effort using a 1988 survey of Australian employees. While controlling for the endogeneity of the firm's choice of incentives and pay, it is found that direct incentive schemes have predicted effects, and the efficiency wage hypothesis is supported: pay and work effort are positively correlated. Two efficiency wage models are tested: Akerlof's gift exchange model, and work discipline arguments regarding monitoring difficulties and threats of dismissal. The latter argument is broadly consistent with the data. © 1991, Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1433 / 1446
页数:14
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