MORAL HAZARD AND LIMITED-LIABILITY - IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THEORY OF THE FIRM

被引：27

作者：

BRANDER, JA

SPENCER, BJ

机构：

来源：

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1989年 / 30卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2526754

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：833 / 849

页数：17

共 32 条

[11]

GREEN RC, 1984, J FINANC ECON, V13, P115, DOI 10.1016/0304-405X(84)90034-5

[12]

HAUGEN R, 1983, J FINANC, V36, P629

[13] ANNUAL SURVEY OF ECONOMIC THEORY: THE THEORY OF MONOPOLY [J].

Hicks, J. R. .

ECONOMETRICA, 1935, 3 (01) :1-20

[14] MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY [J].

HOLMSTROM, B .

BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01) :74-91

[15] THEORY OF FIRM - MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR, AGENCY COSTS AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE [J].

JENSEN, MC ;

MECKLING, WH .

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1976, 3 (04) :305-360

[16] RISKY DEBT, INVESTMENT INCENTIVES, AND REPUTATION IN A SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM [J].

JOHN, K ;

NACHMAN, DC .

JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1985, 40 (03) :863-878

[17] STATE-PREFERENCE MODEL OF OPTIMAL FINANCIAL LEVERAGE [J].

KRAUS, A ;

LITZENBERGER, RH .

JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1973, 28 (04) :911-922

[18] INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION [J].

LELAND, HE ;

PYLE, DH .

JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1977, 32 (02) :371-387

[19]

Maksimovic V., 1986, THESIS HARVARD U

[20]

MODIGLIANI F, 1958, AM ECON REV, V48, P261

← 1 2 3 4 →