NOISY JURIES AND THE CHOICE OF TRIAL MODE IN A SEQUENTIAL SIGNALING GAME - THEORY AND EVIDENCE

被引:13
作者
GAY, GD
GRACE, MF
KALE, JR
NOE, TH
机构
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2555689
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:196 / 213
页数:18
相关论文
共 17 条
[1]   EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN SIGNALING GAMES [J].
BANKS, JS ;
SOBEL, J .
ECONOMETRICA, 1987, 55 (03) :647-661
[2]   LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J].
BEBCHUK, LA .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1984, 15 (03) :404-415
[3]   SIGNALING GAMES AND STABLE EQUILIBRIA [J].
CHO, IK ;
KREPS, DM .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1987, 102 (02) :179-221
[4]  
Gelfand A., 1977, JURIMETRICS J, V17, P292
[5]  
GELFAND AE, 1977, MODELLING CRIMINAL J
[6]  
Kalven Harry, 1971, AM JURY
[7]  
KAMISAR Y, 1980, BASIC CRIMINAL PROCE
[8]   INFORMATION-PROCESSING AND JURY DECISION-MAKING [J].
KLEVORICK, AK ;
ROTHSCHILD, M ;
WINSHIP, C .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1984, 23 (03) :245-278
[9]   MODEL OF THE JURY DECISION-PROCESS [J].
KLEVORICK, AK ;
ROTHSCHILD, M .
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 1979, 8 (01) :141-164
[10]   SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIA [J].
KREPS, DM ;
WILSON, R .
ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (04) :863-894