THE ROTTEN-KID THEOREM MEETS THE SAMARITANS DILEMMA

被引:98
作者
BRUCE, N [1 ]
WALDMAN, M [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV CALIF LOS ANGELES,LOS ANGELES,CA 90024
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2937823
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A familiar result in the economic theory of the family is Becker's rotten-kid theorem. This theorem states that altruism by a family member will lead other selfish members to act efficiently from the family viewpoint. We extend Becker's one-period model to two periods and show that parental altruism can result in an inefficiency known in other contexts as the Samaritan's dilemma. Implications of this for transfer arrangements within the family and for the Ricardian equivalence theorem are drawn. © 1990 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and The Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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页码:155 / 165
页数:11
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