TIT-FOR-TAT AMONG THE IROQUOIS - A GAME-THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE ON INTERTRIBAL POLITICAL-ORGANIZATION

被引:7
作者
BONHAGEFREUND, MT
KURLAND, JA
机构
[1] Department of Anthropology, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802
关键词
ITERATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA; EVOLUTION; COOPERATION; POPULATION; BEHAVIOR; MODEL;
D O I
10.1006/jaar.1994.1016
中图分类号
Q98 [人类学];
学科分类号
030303 ;
摘要
The Iroquois have intrigued scholars since anthropology's Nineteenth Century beginnings, in part, because their system of the League epitomizes intertribal politics unsullied by the presence of the State. We suggest that the emergence of an inter-group form of political management lacking the usual hierarchical institutions of stratified and statist societies can arise in an environment of tribal warfare and mistrust, if there are rather minimal conditions governing social interaction. These conditions have been investigated by game theorists analyzing the Tit-for-Tat solution to the ''Prisoner's Dilemma,'' by biologists studying the evolution of cooperation, and by social scientists analyzing competition and cooperation in human societies. The Prisoner's Dilemma model includes a number of predictions that can be tested in the Iroquois by means of archaeological and ethnohistorical data and most of these predictions are confirmed. We conclude that the formalisms of game theory as well as the individualistic orientation of evolutionary biology provide new insights into the study of social organization and political anthropology. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
引用
收藏
页码:278 / 305
页数:28
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