COMMITMENT VERSUS DISCRETION IN THE PEASANT-DICTATOR GAME

被引：26

作者：

VANHUYCK, JB

BATTALIO, RC

WALTERS, MF

机构：

[1] Texas A and M University, College Station

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1995年 / 10卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/game.1995.1028

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We report an experiment designed to test the influence of commitment versus discretion in a simple bargaining game. Game theory predicts and the public policy literature emphasizes that the ability to make commitments promotes efficiency. We find that commitment does significantly increase efficiency in the experiment. Finally, we relate our findings to the extant literature on extensive form bargaining experiments by examining fairness and trust as explanations for some observed anomalies. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.

引用

页码：143 / 170

页数：28

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