ELECTIONS AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY CYCLES

[1] ALESINA A, 1987, IN PRESS Q J EC

[2] Alesina A. F., 1986, POLITICAL PARTIES BU

[3] BACKUS D, 1985, AM ECON REV, V75, P530

[4] EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN SIGNALING GAMES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1987, 55 (03) : 647 - 661

[5] DETERMINATION OF THE PUBLIC DEBT [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1979, 87 (05) : 940 - 971

[6] SIGNALING GAMES AND STABLE EQUILIBRIA [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1987, 102 (02) : 179 - 221

[7] A POSITIVE THEORY OF DISCRETIONARY POLICY, THE COST OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND THE BENEFITS OF A CONSTITUTION [J]. ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 1986, 24 (03) : 367 - 388

[8] INCUMBENT PERFORMANCE AND ELECTORAL CONTROL [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1986, 50 (1-3) : 5 - 25

[9] EMPIRICAL-STUDY OF POLITICO-ECONOMIC INTERACTION IN UNITED-STATES [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, 1978, 60 (02) : 174 - 183

[10] FRIEDMAN J, 1971, REV ECON STUD, V28, P1

[1] ALESINA A, 1987, IN PRESS Q J EC

[2] Alesina A. F., 1986, POLITICAL PARTIES BU

[3] BACKUS D, 1985, AM ECON REV, V75, P530

[4] EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN SIGNALING GAMES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1987, 55 (03) : 647 - 661

[5] DETERMINATION OF THE PUBLIC DEBT [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1979, 87 (05) : 940 - 971

[6] SIGNALING GAMES AND STABLE EQUILIBRIA [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1987, 102 (02) : 179 - 221

[7] A POSITIVE THEORY OF DISCRETIONARY POLICY, THE COST OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND THE BENEFITS OF A CONSTITUTION [J]. ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 1986, 24 (03) : 367 - 388

[8] INCUMBENT PERFORMANCE AND ELECTORAL CONTROL [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1986, 50 (1-3) : 5 - 25

[9] EMPIRICAL-STUDY OF POLITICO-ECONOMIC INTERACTION IN UNITED-STATES [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, 1978, 60 (02) : 174 - 183

[10] FRIEDMAN J, 1971, REV ECON STUD, V28, P1