THE PURE THEORY OF LARGE 2-CANDIDATE ELECTIONS

[1] A NOTE ON THE PROBABILITY OF CASTING A DECISIVE VOTE [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1981, 25 (01) : 152 - 162

[2] ELECTORAL OUTCOMES WITH PROBABILISTIC VOTING AND NASH SOCIAL-WELFARE MAXIMA [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1981, 15 (01) : 113 - 121

[3] PARETO OPTIMALITY OF POLICY PROPOSALS WITH PROBABILISTIC VOTING [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1982, 39 (03) : 427 - 433

[4] COUGHLIN P, 1983, UNPUB J EC THEORY

[5] SOCIAL UTILITY-FUNCTIONS FOR STRATEGIC DECISIONS IN PROBABILISTIC VOTING MODELS [J]. MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 1983, 4 (03) : 275 - 293

[6] De Grazia A., 1953, ISIS, V44, P42, DOI [10.1086/348187, DOI 10.1086/348187]

[7] Downs A., 1957, EC THEORY DEMOCRACY

[8] PARADOX OF NOT VOTING - DECISION THEORETIC ANALYSIS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1974, 68 (02) : 525 - 536

[9] CLOSENESS COUNTS ONLY IN HORSESHOES AND DANCING [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1975, 69 (03) : 920 - 925

[10] GALE D, 1965, MATH ANN, P159

[1] A NOTE ON THE PROBABILITY OF CASTING A DECISIVE VOTE [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1981, 25 (01) : 152 - 162

[2] ELECTORAL OUTCOMES WITH PROBABILISTIC VOTING AND NASH SOCIAL-WELFARE MAXIMA [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1981, 15 (01) : 113 - 121

[3] PARETO OPTIMALITY OF POLICY PROPOSALS WITH PROBABILISTIC VOTING [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1982, 39 (03) : 427 - 433

[4] COUGHLIN P, 1983, UNPUB J EC THEORY

[5] SOCIAL UTILITY-FUNCTIONS FOR STRATEGIC DECISIONS IN PROBABILISTIC VOTING MODELS [J]. MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 1983, 4 (03) : 275 - 293

[6] De Grazia A., 1953, ISIS, V44, P42, DOI [10.1086/348187, DOI 10.1086/348187]

[7] Downs A., 1957, EC THEORY DEMOCRACY

[8] PARADOX OF NOT VOTING - DECISION THEORETIC ANALYSIS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1974, 68 (02) : 525 - 536

[9] CLOSENESS COUNTS ONLY IN HORSESHOES AND DANCING [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1975, 69 (03) : 920 - 925

[10] GALE D, 1965, MATH ANN, P159