DEFINITION AND PROPERTIES OF COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIA IN A 2-PLAYER GAME OF INFINITE DURATION

[1] A Counterexample in Linear-Quadratic Games: Existence of Nonlinear Nash Solutions [J]. JOURNAL OF OPTIMIZATION THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, 1974, 14 (04) : 425 - 430

[2] Basar T, 1982, DYNAMIC NONCOOPERATI

[3] Brock W. A., 1976, Mathematics of Operations Research, V1, P337, DOI 10.1287/moor.1.4.337

[4] BROCK WA, 1970, REV EC STUDIES, V37, P276

[5] NON-COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM FOR SUPERGAMES [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1971, 38 (113) : 1 - 12

[6] HAURIE A, 1984, LARGE SCALE SYST, V6, P107

[7] HAURIE A, 1983, P AM CONTROL C SAN F

[8] HAURIE A, 1981, 10TH P IFIP C OPT TE, P715

[9] MONITORING COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN A REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (05) : 1127 - 1148

[10] PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM IN A BARGAINING MODEL [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (01) : 97 - 109

[1] A Counterexample in Linear-Quadratic Games: Existence of Nonlinear Nash Solutions [J]. JOURNAL OF OPTIMIZATION THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, 1974, 14 (04) : 425 - 430

[2] Basar T, 1982, DYNAMIC NONCOOPERATI

[3] Brock W. A., 1976, Mathematics of Operations Research, V1, P337, DOI 10.1287/moor.1.4.337

[4] BROCK WA, 1970, REV EC STUDIES, V37, P276

[5] NON-COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM FOR SUPERGAMES [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1971, 38 (113) : 1 - 12

[6] HAURIE A, 1984, LARGE SCALE SYST, V6, P107

[7] HAURIE A, 1983, P AM CONTROL C SAN F

[8] HAURIE A, 1981, 10TH P IFIP C OPT TE, P715

[9] MONITORING COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN A REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (05) : 1127 - 1148

[10] PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM IN A BARGAINING MODEL [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (01) : 97 - 109