INCENTIVES, LEARNING, AND COMPENSATION - A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL-INVESTIGATION OF MANAGERIAL LABOR CONTRACTS

被引：200

作者：

MURPHY, KJ

机构：

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1986年 / 17卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2555628

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：59 / 76

页数：18

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