CARTEL ENFORCEMENT WITH UNCERTAINTY ABOUT COSTS

被引：66

作者：

CRAMTON, PC

PALFREY, TR

机构：

来源：

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1990年 / 31卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2526626

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：17 / 47

页数：31

共 31 条

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