SYSTEMATIC DESIGN OF A FAMILY OF ATTACK-RESISTANT AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS

The extensive use of open networks and distributed systems poses serious threats to the security of end-to-end communications and network components themselves. A necessary foundation for securing a network is the ability to reliably authenticate communication partners and other network entities. One-way password-based authentication techniques are not sufficient to cope with the issues at hand. Modern designs rely on two-way cryptographic authentication protocols. However, most existing designs suffer from one or more limitations: they require synchronization of local clocks, they are subject to export restrictions because of the way they use cryptographic functions, they are not amenable to use in lower layers of network protocols because of the size and complexity of messages they use, etc. Designing suitable cryptographic protocols that cater to large and dynamic network communities but do not suffer from the above problems presents substantial challenges in terms of ease of use, efficiency, flexibility, and above all security. This paper discusses the above challenges; shows how a few simple protocols, including one proposed by ISO, can easily be broken; and derives a series of desirable properties that authentication protocols should exhibit to meet the requirements of future large and dynamic network communities. Then the paper describes a methodology that was developed to systematically build and test the security of a family of cryptographic two-way authentication protocols that are as simple as possible yet resistant to a wide class of attacks, efficient, easy to implement and use, and amenable to many different networking environments. It also discusses several concrete examples of protocols of that family that presents various advantages in specific distributed system scenarios.