COLLUSION AND THE INCENTIVES FOR INFORMATION SHARING

被引:186
作者
CLARKE, RN
机构
来源
BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1983年 / 14卷 / 02期
关键词
D O I
10.2307/3003640
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:383 / 394
页数:12
相关论文
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