THE DYNAMICS OF TRADE-UNIONISM AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC-PERFORMANCE

被引:51
作者
GOLDEN, M
机构
[1] University of California, Los Angeles
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2939052
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
I test two theories of the political processes of trade unions. The first argues that wage moderation depends on a centralized labor movement. The second contends that, institutional conditions permitting, unions' coordination of bargaining strategies is sufficient. Coordination is most likely to be achieved when there are small number of unions that do not compete for members, that is, when union monopoly is high. Important empirical anomalies may be resolved by analyzing the effects of union centralization and monopoly separately, rather than combining them into a composite index of corporatism. Reanalyzing comparative data from Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development countries between 1963 and 1985 largely corroborates the hypothesis that monopoly is more important than either centralization or composite indices of corporatism for national economic performance. The conceptual rationale underlying indices of corporatism should be reexamined.
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页码:439 / 454
页数:16
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