ON THE INDEPENDENCE FROM IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES IN PROBABILISTIC CHOICE MODELS

被引:8
作者
SAMUELSON, L
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D O I
10.1016/0022-0531(85)90050-X
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
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页码:376 / 389
页数:14
相关论文
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