THE GROVES SCHEME, PROFIT SHARING AND MORAL HAZARD

被引：9

作者：

COHEN, SI ^{[1
]}

LOEB, M ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV MARYLAND,COLL BUSINESS & MANAGEMENT,COLLEGE PK,MD 20742

来源：

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 1984年 / 30卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1287/mnsc.30.1.20

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：20 / 24

页数：5

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