HIERARCHIES AND COMPENSATION - A CASE-STUDY

[1] BAKER G, 1992, STUDY INTERNAL LABOR

[2] DOERINGER PB, 1985, INT LABOR MARKETS MA

[3] Lazear E., 1992, PERFORMANCE MEASUREM

[4] RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS AS OPTIMUM LABOR CONTRACTS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1981, 89 (05) : 841 - 864

[5] EXPERIENCE, PERFORMANCE, AND EARNINGS [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1980, 95 (04) : 703 - 736

[6] ARE THOSE PAID MORE REALLY MORE PRODUCTIVE - THE CASE OF EXPERIENCE [J]. JOURNAL OF HUMAN RESOURCES, 1981, 16 (02) : 186 - 216

[7] ROSEN S, 1986, AM ECON REV, V76, P701

[8] Rosenbaum J. E., 1984, CAREER MOBILITY CORP

[9] JOB ASSIGNMENTS, SIGNALING, AND EFFICIENCY [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1984, 15 (02) : 255 - 267

[1] BAKER G, 1992, STUDY INTERNAL LABOR

[2] DOERINGER PB, 1985, INT LABOR MARKETS MA

[3] Lazear E., 1992, PERFORMANCE MEASUREM

[4] RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS AS OPTIMUM LABOR CONTRACTS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1981, 89 (05) : 841 - 864

[5] EXPERIENCE, PERFORMANCE, AND EARNINGS [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1980, 95 (04) : 703 - 736

[6] ARE THOSE PAID MORE REALLY MORE PRODUCTIVE - THE CASE OF EXPERIENCE [J]. JOURNAL OF HUMAN RESOURCES, 1981, 16 (02) : 186 - 216

[7] ROSEN S, 1986, AM ECON REV, V76, P701

[8] Rosenbaum J. E., 1984, CAREER MOBILITY CORP

[9] JOB ASSIGNMENTS, SIGNALING, AND EFFICIENCY [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1984, 15 (02) : 255 - 267