LEARNING, CORPORATE-CONTROL AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS IN VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTS

被引：76

作者：

CHAN, YS

SIEGEL, D

THAKOR, AV

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2526845

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：365 / 381

页数：17

共 17 条

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