STRATEGIC INFORMATION REVELATION

被引：175

作者：

OKUNOFUJIWARA, M

POSTLEWAITE, A

SUZUMURA, K

机构：

[1] UNIV PENN,PHILADELPHIA,PA 19104

[2] HITOTSUBASHI UNIV,KUNITACHI,TOKYO 186,JAPAN

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 1990年 / 57卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会; 日本学术振兴会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2297541

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We analyze the problem in which agents have non-public information and are to play an asymmetric information game. The agents may reveal some or all of their information to other agents prior to playing this game. Revelation is via exogenously specified certifiable statements. The equilibria resulting from various revelation strategies are used to determine equilibrium revelation of information. Sufficient conditions are provided for complete revelation of all private information. A number of examples are provided illustrating when revelation will or will not occur in commonly analyzed games. © 1990 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

引用

页码：25 / 47

页数：23

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