DUOPOLISTIC VERTICAL RESTRAINTS

被引：43

作者：

GALOR, E

机构：

[1] Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1991年 / 35卷 / 06期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0014-2921(91)90117-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In an industry where competition exists at the wholesale level, vertical restraints are not necessarily desirable from the standpoint of the manufacturers. When vertical restraints are employed, it is never in the form of Retail Price Maintenance, but rather in the form of Franchise Fee pricing. When the products produced by the manufacturers are only slightly differentiated, the producers may benefit from the double marginalization that arises with linear pricing. Such double marginalization results in higher retail prices which relieve competitive pressures. © 1991.

引用

页码：1237 / 1253

页数：17