NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES MAY CAUSE DELAY IN NEGOTIATION

被引：43

作者：

JEHIEL, P ^{[1
]}

MOLDOVANU, B ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV BONN,DEPT ECON,D-53113 BONN,GERMANY

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1995年 / 63卷 / 06期

关键词：

BARGAINING; EXTERNALITIES; DELAY;

D O I：

10.2307/2171772

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study the strategic equilibria of a negotiation game where potential buyers are affected by identity-dependent, negative externalities. The unique equilibrium of long, finitely repeated generic games can either display delay-where a transaction can take place only in several stages before the deadline-or, in spite of the random element in the game, a well-defined buyer exists that obtains the object with probability close to one.

引用

页码：1321 / 1335

页数：15

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