INCENTIVES IN INCENTIVE CONTRACTING - AN APPLICATION OF THE MIMIC MODEL

被引:1
作者
BRUMM, HJ
机构
[1] Office of the Chief Economist, US General Accounting Office, Washington
关键词
D O I
10.1080/00036849200000147
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A handful of empirical studies have endeavoured to analyse the cost-containment effectiveness of the incentive contracts that the Department of Defence has used for its acquisition of weapon systems. A serious omission from all of these studies has been a consideration of the motivation of contractors to renegotiate these contracts many times. Since contract modification is an important and recognized part of incentive contracting, it is surprising that so little attention has been paid to the contractor's incentive to seek these modifications. The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the effects of incentive contract cost-sharing provisions and contract renegotiations on contractor cost-savings effort.
引用
收藏
页码:337 / 345
页数:9
相关论文
共 26 条
[1]  
AIGNER DJ, 1984, HDB ECONOMETRICS, V2
[2]   MONITORING OF PERFORMANCE IN ORGANIZATIONAL CONTRACTING - THE CASE OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT [J].
BARON, DP ;
BESANKO, D .
SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1988, 90 (03) :329-356
[3]  
BECKETT J, 1985, WASHINGTON MONTH APR, P43
[4]  
Bentler P. M., 1989, EQS STRUCTURAL EQUAT
[5]  
BENTLER PM, 1980, PSYCHOL BULL, V88, P588, DOI 10.1037/0033-2909.107.2.238
[6]  
Bollen KA., 2014, STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS, DOI [10.1007/s11336-013-9335-3, DOI 10.1002/9781118619179]
[7]   A NEW VIEW OF THE MARKET-STRUCTURE PERFORMANCE DEBATE [J].
BOTHWELL, JL ;
COOLEY, TF ;
HALL, TE .
JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 1984, 32 (04) :397-417
[8]  
BURNETT WB, 1990, STRUCTURE AM IND
[9]  
CROSS JG, 1968, WESTERN ECON J, V6, P205
[10]   INCENTIVE CONTRACTING FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE - PROBLEM OF OPTIMAL RISK SHARING [J].
CUMMINS, JM .
BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1977, 8 (01) :168-185