MONITORING OF PERFORMANCE IN ORGANIZATIONAL CONTRACTING - THE CASE OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT

被引：15

作者：

BARON, DP ^{[1
]}

BESANKO, D ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] INDIANA UNIV,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401

来源：

SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1988年 / 90卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/3440312

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：329 / 356

页数：28

共 13 条

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