COMPETITION FOR AGENCY CONTRACTS

被引：132

作者：

MCAFEE, RP ^{[1
]}

MCMILLAN, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF SAN DIEGO,LA JOLLA,CA 92093

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1987年 / 18卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2555554

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：296 / 307

页数：12

共 31 条

[1]

Arrow K. J., 1985, PRINCIPALS AGENTS

[2]

BARON DP, 1987, MONITORING MORAL HAZ

[3]

Elliot John, 1970, IMPERIAL SPAIN 1469

[4]

GONIK J, 1978, HARVARD BUSINESS REV, V56, P16

[5] SELF-SELECTION BY CONTRACTUAL CHOICE AND THEORY OF SHARECROPPING [J].

HALLAGAN, W .

BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1978, 9 (02) :344-354

[6] ALLOCATION MECHANISMS AND THE DESIGN OF AUCTIONS [J].

HARRIS, M ;

RAVIV, A .

ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (06) :1477-1499

[7] OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J].

HARRIS, M ;

RAVIV, A .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1979, 20 (02) :231-259

[8] MORAL HAZARD IN TEAMS [J].

HOLMSTROM, B .

BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1982, 13 (02) :324-340

[9] AGGREGATION AND LINEARITY IN THE PROVISION OF INTERTEMPORAL INCENTIVES [J].

HOLMSTROM, B ;

MILGROM, P .

ECONOMETRICA, 1987, 55 (02) :303-328

[10] MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY [J].

HOLMSTROM, B .

BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01) :74-91

← 1 2 3 4 →