COMPETITION FOR AGENCY CONTRACTS

被引：132

作者：

MCAFEE, RP ^{[1
]}

MCMILLAN, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF SAN DIEGO,LA JOLLA,CA 92093

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1987年 / 18卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2555554

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：296 / 307

页数：12

共 31 条

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[16]

MARRIOTT R, 1961, INCENTIVE PAYMENT SY

[17]

MCAFEE RP, 1987, J ECON LIT, V25, P699

[18] BIDDING FOR CONTRACTS - A PRINCIPAL-AGENT ANALYSIS [J].

MCAFEE, RP ;

MCMILLAN, J .

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1986, 17 (03) :326-338

[19]

MELUMAD N, 1986, 895 STANF U GRAD SCH

[20] OPTIMAL COORDINATION MECHANISMS IN GENERALIZED PRINCIPAL AGENT PROBLEMS [J].

MYERSON, RB .

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 1982, 10 (01) :67-81

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