BIDDING FOR CONTRACTS - A PRINCIPAL-AGENT ANALYSIS

被引：213

作者：

MCAFEE, RP

MCMILLAN, J

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2555714

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：326 / 338

页数：13

共 13 条

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BERHOLD, M
[J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1971, 85 (03) : 460 - 482
[2] CUMMINS MT, 1977, BELL J EC, V8, P168
[3] DEMAYO P, 1983, AUCTIONS BIDDING CON
[4] FOX JR, 1974, ARMING AM US BUYS AR
[5] AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM
GROSSMAN, SJ
HART, OD
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1983, 51 (01) : 7 - 45
[6] LAFFONT J, 1985, AUCTIONING INCENTIVE
[7] OPTIMAL AUCTIONS WITH RISK AVERSE BUYERS
MASKIN, E
RILEY, J
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1984, 52 (06) : 1473 - 1518
[8] SELLING TO RISK AVERSE BUYERS WITH UNOBSERVABLE TASTES
MATTHEWS, SA
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1983, 30 (02) : 370 - 400
[9] MCAFEE RP, 1986, 10 U W ONT CTR DEC S
[10] MCAFEE RP, 1986, INCENTIVES GOVT CONT