ASYMMETRIC BIDDING IN 2ND-PRICE, COMMON-VALUE AUCTIONS

被引：6

作者：

HARSTAD, RM

机构：

[1] Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1991年 / 35卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(91)90138-B

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Two comparative static characterizations for common-value auctions under second-price rules are extended to heterogeneous bidders: the willingness-to-pay of the two highest bidders is enhanced on average by the release of public information, and best responses are less aggressive when facing more rival bidders. © 1991.

引用

页码：249 / 252

页数：4

共 8 条

[1]

BIKHCHANDANI S, 1990, IN PRESS J EC THEORY

[2] A CLASS OF DOMINANCE SOLVABLE COMMON-VALUE AUCTIONS [J].