SIGNALING IN A MODEL OF MONETARY-POLICY WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

被引:81
作者
VICKERS, J
机构
来源
OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES | 1986年 / 38卷 / 03期
关键词
D O I
10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041751
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
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页码:443 / 455
页数:13
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