Information, access, and contributions: A signaling model of lobbying

被引：107

作者：

Lohmann, S

机构：

[1] Department of Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, 90024-1472, CA

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 1995年 / 85卷 / 3-4期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF01048199

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Interest groups pay monetary contributions to gain access and provide information to a policymaker. If their interests are aligned with those of the policymaker's constituency, they have costless access and report their private information truthfully. If their interests conflict, they are forced to pay a strictly positive contribution in order to enhance the credibility of their reports. The policymaker bases her policy decision on the competing reports and the size of the contributions accompanying these reports. The interest groups' contribution decisions are plagued by a free rider problem. I derive the implications of this problem for the size and pattern of contributions and for the degree of information aggregation.

引用

页码：267 / 284

页数：18

共 32 条

[11]

KRUEGER AO, 1974, AM ECON REV, V64, P291

[12] A SIGNALING MODEL OF INFORMATIVE AND MANIPULATIVE POLITICAL-ACTION [J].

LOHMANN, S .

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1993, 87 (02) :319-333

[13]

LOHMANN S, 1994, AM ECON REV, V84, P518

[14]

LOHMANN S, 1993, SIGNALING MODEL COMP

[15]

LOHMANN S, 1993, POLITICAL EC I INFOR, P437

[16]

Magee StephenP., 1989, BLACK HOLE TARIFFS E

[17]

MCCARTY N, 1993, UNPUB STRATEGIC DECI

[18]

Morton R. B., 1992, ECON POLIT-OXFORD, V4, P79, DOI DOI 10.1111/J.1468-0343.1992.TB00056.X

[19] ENDOGENOUS TARIFF THEORY - A CRITICAL SURVEY [J].

NELSON, D .

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 1988, 32 (03) :796-837

[20]

Olson M., 1965, LOGIC COLLECTIVE ACT

← 1 2 3 4 →